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CURRENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-Constitutional Law-VAGRAN Y STATUTES AND
In Alegata v. Commonwealth,' defendants were convicted for violation of five "vagrancy" statutes designed to curtail the
activities of: persons suspected of unlawful design who do not give
a satisfactory account of themselves; 2 idle persons who, not having
visible means of support, live without lawful employment;3 persons who
rove about from place to place, living without visible means of support;4 known criminals if acting in a suspicious manner;5 and idle and
disorderly persons. 6 Defendants maintained that these statutory provisions were unconstitutional on their face because they did not state
a crime for which punishment could have been imposed, and that the
DUE PROCESS.

1. Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967).
2. MASS. AN,-. LAws ch. 41, 5 98 (1957): "During the night time ... [police officers]
may examine all persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design,
and may demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going ...
Persons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves may be
arrested by the police, . . . and taken before a district court to be examined and
prosecuted."
3. Id., ch. 272, § 66 (1951): "Idle persons who, not having visible means of support,
live without lawful employment; persons wandering abroad and visiting tippling shops
or houses of ill fame, or lodging in groceries, outhouses, market places, sheds, barns
or in the open air, and not giving a good account of themselves; persons wandering
abroad and begging, or who go about from door to door, or place themselves in
public ways, passages or other public places to beg or receive alms, and who do not
come within the description of tramps . . . shall be deemed vagrants and may be
punished by imprisonment for not more than six months in the house of correction."
4. Id., ch. 272, § 63 (1902): 'Whoever, not being under 17, a blind person or a
person asking charity within his own town, roves about from place to place begging,
or living without labor or visible means of support, shall be deemed a tramp." § 64 "A
tramp shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than
30 days."
5. Id., ch. 272, § 68 (1913): "A person known to be a pickpocket, thief or burglar, if
acting in a suspicious manner around any . . . shop . . . shall be deemed a vagabond
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not less than
four nor more than 12 months."
6. Id., ch. 272, § 53 (1956): "Stubborn children, runaways, both male and female,
common railers and brawlers, persons who with offensive and disorderly act or language
accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons in
speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons, disturbers of the peace, keepers of noisy
houses and persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by imprisonment in
a jail or house of correction for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more
than $200.00, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
[ 1162 1
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words which purported to define the prohibited conduct were vague
and indefinite.
In reversing all but one of the convictions, 7 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that these provisions were unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' and article twelve of the Massachusetts Constitution.9
Vagrancy statutes punish a person for what he is, and not what he has
done. 10 In Handlerv. City and County of Denver,"' vagrancy was said
to be a present condition or status.'2 These offenses have a long history,
beginning with the Statute of Labourers," which confined the laboring
population to its "place of abode" and required them to work at speci4
fied rates of wages. Wandering or vagrancy thus became a crime.'
7. Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 at 211 (Mass. 1967). In upholding the
conviction for "idle and disorderly persons" the court viewed the statute as definitive
enough to withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness. It was
felt that the meaning of "disorderly" had a common understanding, especially in the
light of the revision of the Massachusetts' criminal laws in 1941 which deleted many
outmoded offenses. Since the "disorderly persons" statute was retained and recent
case law, legal scholarship and the Model Penal Code (§ 250.2) have defined its meaning,
the court felt that definitiveness was not wanting. It is important to note that this
rationale for upholding the statute has not gone uncriticized. In this era of fast-moving
social change, "disorderly conduct" statutes and their definitions open up a wide field
for judicial abuse. They may lead to an abridgement of civil liberties, especially when
applied to conduct centering around the Civil Rights movement and the anti-Vietnam
demonstrations. For a discussion of the dangers involved in their abuse, see Watts,
Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society, 9 W. & M. L. Rv.349 (1967).
8. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9. DECLARATION OF RiGHTs OF THE CONSTITUTION OF Tm CoMMONwEALTH OF MASS.
art. XI1 ".... and no subject shall be arrested . . . or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his
life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
10. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YA.E L.J. 1 at 12-13 (1960). See

Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF.
L.Rav. 557 (1960).
11. 102 Colo. 53, 58, 77 P.2d 132, 135 (1938).
12. At Common Law, "vagrancy" was wandering or going about from place to
place by idle persons who had no lawful or visible means of support and who sub-

sisted on charity and did not work, though able to do so. State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash.
227, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in the
dismissal of certiorari in Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966); Fenster v.
Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1967).
13. Statute of Labourers of 1349 & 1350, 23 & 25 Edw. 3 (st. 1).
14. 3 J. STFPHAN, THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 266 (1883).
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Crime prevention has been given as their primary purpose"' although
other explanations have been cited."' When challenged in the past, the

courts have given three primary reasons for their validity: 1) they constitute a reasonable exercise of the police power; 1 2) the standard of

conduct within the statute is sufficiently definite to withstand a constitutional challenge of vagueness and uncertainty;' 3) the conduct or the
circumstances of the individual's presence constituted an offense or the
suggestion of an intent to commit an offense. 19
15. District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947) "A vagrant is a
probable criminal; and the purpose .. . is to prevent crimes which may likely flow from
this mode of life:' H.R. REP. No. 1248, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 8099-8100 (1941). "The
measure [vagrancy statute for the District of Columbia] is directed primarily to persons
who are a potential menace to the community."
16. State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900). The provisions of vagrancy
statutes ". . . rest upon the economic truth that industry is necessary for the preservation of society, and that he who, being able to work, and not able otherwise to support
himself deliberately plans to exist by the labors of others, is an enemy to society and to
the commonwealth." See People v. Bell, 204 Misc. 71, 74, 125 N.YS.2d 117, 119
(Nassau County Cr.), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953); Foote, VagrancyType Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. RFv. 604 (1955-56).
17. State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933):
Society recognizes that vagrancy is a parasitic disease; which, if allowed to
spread, will sap the life of that upon which it feeds. To prevent the
spread of the disease, the carrier must be reached. In order to discourage,
and, if possible, to eradicate vagrancy, our Legislature has enacted a statute
defining vagrants and penalizing them according to its terms. Other Legislatures have pursued the same course. We see no reason why this cannot,
or should not, be done as a valid exercise of the police power.
Accord, State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946); McNeilly v. State, 119
N.J.L. 237, 195 A. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1937); State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 142 A.2d 636
(1958); Dominguez v. City and Council of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961).
18. Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949). Portland, Ore., Ordinance
No. 76339, § 16-617, made it unlawful for any person between the hours of 1 A.M.
and 5 A.M. to roam or be upon any street, alley or public place without having or
disclosing a lawful purpose. In the eyes of the court, the statutory language was not
unduly uncertain or vague, but, on the contrary, evinced a clear, definite and ascertainable standard of guilt; McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195 A. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1937);
Dominguez v. City and Council of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961). See
People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N.E.2d 882 (1937); Hicks v. District of Columbia, 197
A.2d 154, 155 (D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 252 (1966). 'The Constitution
does not require impossible standards on statutes, and all that is necessary is a reasonable
degree of certainty." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
19. Dominguez v. City and Council of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961).
Denver, Colo., Ordinance § 824.1-7 made it unlawful for any person to wander about the
streets late at night and not be able to give a satisfactory account of himself. "The City's
only witness [a police officer] testified that at approximately 3:00 A.M. the defendant was
seen in front of the La Bonita Cafe in an automobile. . . . [tihat the defendant ran
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Recently, statutes similar to those in the principal case have been
viewed as not being specific enough to survive a constitutional challenge

of due process. A New Jersey statute20 declared a person "disorderly"
if he was apprehended and unable to give a good account of himself.
In invalidating the statute, the court in U. S. v. Margeson2 l considered
the word "good" so subjective that it enabled one to draw many conclusions as to its precise definition.22 Similarly, an ordinance defining

"disorderly conduct" as standing, loitering or strolling in any place iri
the city and not being able to give a satisfactory account or being with-

out lawful means of support was held invalid because of the imprecision
of its terms."3 Recently, a statute which defined vagrants as persons who,
from the car to another location, and . . . that the window of the car had been
broken. . . . tihat while the defendant was running he dropped a frozen chicken
and that the defendant was arrested a few blocks from the scene of the alleged
violation. [He further] testified that when the defendant was asked why he was
running he first said he was just running, but later said he was running to his girl's
house." (147 Colo. at 236, 363 P.2d at 663) The court reasoned that the conduct of the
defendant was of such a nature that it was proper for the officer to require a satisfactory
exculpatory statement and that the defendant's explanation was not a satisfactory account
in view of all the circumstances. See State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 142 A.2d 636 (1958);
Harris v. District of Columbia, 132 A.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
20. NJ. STAT. Arx. 2A: 170-1 (1952).
21. 259 F.Supp. 256 (1966). Acting upon information from an off-duty policeman,
police officers apprehended defendants who were fleeing from the back door of a motel
room. The officers were acting upon the report of "suspicious conduct" of the defendants which was heightened by the refusal of the officers' request to enter the
motel room. After searching a cardboard container carried by the defendants, the
officers found a revolver. One of the defendant's identification was different from that
stated in the motel register and the defendant explained that he had moved recently
and had not been able to change his automobile registration. Defendant also stated
that he was a television salesman which, he suggested, was equivalent to being a G.E.
Corporation representative as registered by the motel. The other defendant's identification had no discrepancy. Both were arrested under the disorderly persons statute for
failure to give a good account of themselves.
22. Id., at 268. The court asked what is a good account? It hypothesized that
"good" could mean "morally good," or above suspicion of a crime, or enough credible
information sufficient so as to negate probable cause. Or, it was felt possibly to mean
that if one does not admit of a crime he has given a good account of himself. Also,
no time limit is stated and one cannot tell how far back in time he may have to
justify himself or his activities in order to avoid the penalties of the statute. See
Edelman v. People, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (dissenting opinion) (the term "dissolute
person" was found by Justice Black to be too vague and uncertain; Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (discussing the meaning of the word "gang" and the phrase
"known to be a member" of a gang); People v. Belcastro, 356 111. 144, 190 N.E. 301
(1934); Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967).
23. Headley v. Selkowvitz, 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965). Miami, Fla. Code §43-10.5 was
declared invalid because it failed to define the area involved within the city or to
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not having visible means of support, live without employment, was declared void. The statute was felt to constitute an overreaching of the
proper limitations of the police power and made lawful conduct criminally punishable. 4
In view of the fact that some courts have held "vagrancy" statutes
valid while others have considered them too vague and uncertain to meet
a constitutional challenge of due process, the question arises as to the
consistency of the courts' standards. The key to the answer lies in the
perplexing problem of deciding what is "vagueness" and "indefinitiveness." 2 5 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested, indefinitiveness is not a
limit the time of day in which it was applicable. Because of its broad terms, the court
felt that any citizen who may be engaged in lawful pursuits would possibly be subject
to arrest merely because he cannot give a satisfactory account.
Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1949). Revised Ordinance
of Boston, c.40, § 34 (1947) stated that "no persons shall, in a street . . . willfully and
unreasonably saunter or loiter for more than seven minutes after being directed by a
policeman to move on." It was declared void on its face since it did not prescribe any
standard capable of intelligent human evaluation in enabling one chargeable with its
violation to discover those conditions which convert lawful conduct into criminal
conduct.
People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1958) A Dunirk, N.Y.
Ordinance c.18, § 10 punished a person for disorderly conduct if he should lounge or
loiter about any street or street corner. It was declared invalid for vagueness and
uncertainty and for failing to provide any standards or criteria by which the prohibited
conduct could be tested. See Hawaii v. Anduka, 48 F.2d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1931).
24. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1967). N.Y. Code
Crim. Pro. 1, S887 was held unconstitutional on the ground that it violated due
process and constituted an overreaching of the proper limitations of the police power
in that it unreasonably made criminal and provided punishment for conduct which in no
way encroached upon the rights or interests of others and which had in no way been
demonstrated to have anything more than the most tenuous connection with the
prevention of crime and preservation of the public order, other than, perhaps, as a
means of harassing, punishing or apprehending suspected criminals in an unconstitutional fashion.
City of Reno v. 2d Judicial Dist. Ct., 427 P.2d 4 (Nev. 1967). Reno, Nev., Municipal
Code 12-112-1 described a person as being disorderly if he was engaged in any illegal
occupation or had evil reputation and was found consorting for an unlawful purpose
with a person or persons who had an evil reputation. It was invalidated for attempting
to make mere status a crime.
25. See Giacco v. Pennsylavania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-403 (1966). "A law fails to meet the
requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to
decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each
particular case." State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); Commonwealth v.
Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,
342 U.S. 337 (1952); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); Connally v. General
Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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quantitative concept.2 6 What may appear too vague as to one subject
may be definite as to anotherY To the minds of some courts, the criticized statutory word or phrase has a well-recognized or common meaning.28 It also may be determined that the challenged portion has a definite and well-settled meaning in the common law.29 In the light of the
fact that the more recent decisions have held "vagrancy" statutes unconstitutional, and with the Supreme Court giving greater force and
effect to concepts of equal justice 3 0 it is probable that courts in the
future will look more rigorously at these statutes in determining their
constitutionality. However, the Supreme Court has yet to decide the
validity of "vagrancy" statutes.31 Until such a case is decided, the courts
are relatively free to construe these statutes with their own notions of
"vagueness" and "indefinitiveness."
Criminal Law and Procedure-ELETRoNIC EAVESDROPPING. In
Katz v. United States,' petitioner was charged with transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute.2 Over
26. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
27. Id., at 525.
28. Id.; Phillips v. Municipal Ct., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 75 P.2d 548 (1938); State v.
Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933); McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195
A. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1937); See People v. Bell, 204 Misc. 71, 74, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (Nassau County Cr.), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953); People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y.
330, 333, 199 N.E. 501, 502 (1936); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. Rzv. 1203 (1953); contra, United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp.
256 (1966), where the court stated, in discussing the meaning of "good account,"
that "the New Jersey courts have not defined it, and we must confess that to
us it is insufficiently precise to pass muster under the 14th Amendment." Contra,
People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 NE.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1958), where the court felt that
while the word "loiter" had acquired a common and accepted meaning, it did not, by
itself, inform a citizen of its criminal application and was left open to arbitrary enforcement.
29. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); contra, Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1948).
30. For a discussion of the dangers of disorderly conduct statutes vis-a-vis our
changing social times, see Watts, Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society,
9 W. & M. L. Rv. 349 (1967).
31. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 197 A.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 252 (1966).
1. 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (Supp. MI, 1958). That statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the

